The death of the unreconstructed judicial positivist, pro-abort, pro-sodomite and statist Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Friday, September 18, 2020, the Feast of Saint Joseph Cupertino and the Commemoration of Ember Saturday in September, has set off a veritable firestorm that will, it would appear, unleash the usual assortment of organized violence and bloodshed undertaken by the professional agitators and, if necessary, assassins and destroyers of property whose movement are, in the large, funded by organizations that have ties in one way or another, if not multiple ways, to personal friend of confidante of Jorge Mario Bergoglio, George Soros. Seeking to undermine, discredit and delegitimize the ability of a duly elected president to discharge his constitutional duties to nominate candidates to serve on the Federal judiciary, including the Supreme Court of the United States of America, the members of the organized crime family of the false opposite of the naturalist “left,” aided and abetted by their violent supporters and paid agents of death and destruction on the streets, are threatening all manner of reprisals if President Donald John Trump dares to exercise the powers of the office that he assumed on January 20, 2017, the Feast of Saints Fabian and Sebastian, and nominates a person—Trump has said that it will be a woman (so much for the best qualified no matter a candidate’s gender or ethnicity) to be considered by the Senate of the United States of America as Ginsburg’s successor.
However, it is not the principal purpose of this commentary to spend much time on the political process that will play out in the Senate of the United States of America, although it is useful to note that the late Ruth Bader Ginsburg told Nina Totenberg of National Public Radio last year that the “court packing” scheme that Democrats are threatening to unleash next year if they win the presidency, retain the majority in the United States House of Representatives and recapture majority control of the United States Senate for the first time in six years was not a good solution:
I have heard that there are some people on the Democratic side who would like to increase the number of judges. I think that was a bad idea when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt tried to pack the court. His plan was for every justice who stays on the court past the age of 70, the president would have the authority to nominate another justice. If that plan had been effective, the court's number would have swelled immediately from nine to 15, and the president would have six appointments to make. (Ginsburg Called Court Packing Plan a Bad Idea.)
You mention before the quote of appearing partisan. Well, if anything would make the court appear partisan then it would be that, one side saying, "When we're in power we're going to enlarge the number of judges so we'll have more people who will vote the way we want them to."
"There is no fixed number in the Constitution. So this court has had as few as 5 as many as 10. Nine seems to be a good number and it's been that way for a long time."
"I have heard that there are some people on the Democratic side who would like to increase the number of judges. I think that was a bad idea" when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt tried it, and reiterated, "I am not at all in favor of that solution." (National Propaganda Radio Interview with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 2019.)
So much hypocrisy, so little time.
I, for one, fail to see how anyone should expect something other than hypocrisy and opportunistic exercises of expediency and political self-interest in the American governmental and political systems, which are, of course, untethered to any kind of adherence of first principles, no less to the pursuit of the common temporal good undertaken with end of advancing man’s final end, namely, the possession of the glory of the Beatific Vision of God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost for all eternity in Heaven. Men who care not for just judgment of Christ the King on their immoral souls will always put expediency above principle, and the American system has devolved now to the point that we are witnessing a set of hapless naturalist careerists, the Republicans, up against the unrelenting, uncompromising and ready to burn the country down to the ground other set of naturalists, a collection of people who, unlike the Republicans, by and large, actually do believe in and are firmly committed to sets of principles that are destructive of souls and thus of all social order.
Moreover, left never quits until its organized thugs secure their goals of pushing their statist envelope to the outer limits before entering the twilight zone. The “left” considers none of endless agenda items that its adherents raise to create one false crisis after another “settled” unless it is settled on their terms without any compromise or equivocation whatsoever. The current agitation over the nomination of a successor to fill the seat held for over twenty-seven years by Ruth Bader Ginsburg has simply poured fuel onto the already burning flames during the quadrennial farce known as a presidential election that leftists intend as a vehicle to put a useful stooge of theirs in the White House or, failing that, to conduct acts of sabotage and mayhem on a national basis to “teach” those who refuse to bend their knee at whatever politically “dogmatic” propositions are put before them to promote. The “progressives”/Jacobins/Bolsheviks will never relinquish power if they put their Trojan Horse stooge in the White House, and they will never cease violence until some such stooge is placed there in the future, at which point they will seek to end elections altogether as “too divisive” and/or seek to disenfranchise citizens who refuse to bow the head and bend the knee at their collective omniscience and infallibility.
However, there is one thing that those who read this commentary should understand first and foremost: despite the hysterical about “coat hanger” abortions if the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, January 22, 1973, are reversed, which is not a given if the Trump-nominee is confirmed by a majority vote of the United States Senate even if a case on the issue of the surgical execution of the innocent preborn makes its way to the Supreme Court for its justices to consider as the movement to decriminalize baby-killing in the United States of America, ladies and gentlemen, started in the states, and it would remain perfectly legal in most of those states if Roe v. Wade, decided over forty-seven years, eight months ago was reversed today.
Only one state, Arkansas, has legislation in place that would ban all surgical baby-killing with no exceptions whatsoever. Another seven states (Louisiana, Michigan, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Wisconsin) would prohibit surgical baby-killing with the so-called "life of the mother exception." Those eight states represent a total of ten percent of the population of the United States of America. Surgical baby-killing would remain legal, both as a result of existing state laws and/or provisions or the decisions of various state courts, in forty-two states and the District of Columbia, meaning that the American slaughter of the innocent preborn via surgical means would be fully accessible to ninety percent of the American population. Anyone who thinks that entire generations of children who have been raised in the culture of ready access to contraception and abortion are going to have an “epiphany” during adulthood about the errors of their past training are not thinking clearly about the state in which we find ourselves at present. Thus, the whole agitation over “protecting” and “reversing” Roe v. Wade is so much preening and posturing for the political bases of the two major organized crime families of the naturalism. Everyone knows nothing would substantial would happen if Roe v. Wade is reversed, making the current agitation just another part of the perpetual dog-and-pony shows that the adversary uses to keep the souls of people in states of anger.
This commentary, therefore, is not going to be focused on the threats made by the professional agitators on the “left” nor on the posturing of self-professed defenders of the Constitution on the “right” as to do so would counterproductive. There are enough naturalists blathering about the specifics of this latest and, most assuredly, consequential dog-and-pony show for me to add anything more than what has been written just above. Life is too short to live in a state of perpetual agitation.
As one whose writing tries to focus on root causes and then on proximate causes of the mess in our anti-Incarnational world of Modernity, it is my purpose in this commentary to provide some historical perspective to the current agitation, including how the late Ruth Bader Ginsburg was nominated by President William Jefferson Blythe Clinton on June 10, 1993, Ginsburg’s comments on constitutional interpretation made during her Senate confirmation hearings, a few of her opinions in cases involving the surgical execution of he innocent preborn and, finally, a review of a “legacy” that is awash with the blood of the innocent.
The Seat Held by Ruth Bader Ginsburg for Twenty-Seven Years was Mario Cuomo’s for the Taking
The advent of the presidential administration of former Arkansas Governor William Jefferson Blythe Clinton on January 10, 1993, provided the pro-baby killing industry many opportunities to advance their wretched agenda. Clinton himself took a pen on January 22, 1993 and erased most of the executive orders/directives that had been issued in the previous twelve years by Presidents Ronald Wilson Reagan and George Herbert Walker Bush. One of the fundamental flaws of a constitutional system that admits of no higher authority than the text of the words than its own documents and which depends upon the prevailing winds of “popular sovereignty” and/or judicial positivism winds up making fundamental matters of moral truth that humans have no authority to change and debate subject to endless change and debate, thus making any perceived accomplishment in one administration ephemeral and easily reversible by the next. Clinton thus used his powers to the fullest, going so far as to veto the partial ban on crushed skull abortions (“partial birth abortion) three times as he knew that Congressional Republicans neither had the votes nor the desire to override.
Clinton, however, played no political games when it came to baby-killing, which is why he sought to replace the retiring Associate Justice Byron White, who was one of the two dissenters in Roe v. Wade, with a man who was completely committed to baby-killing as a constitutional “right” and who was capable of using one legally sophistic argument after another in its support during a confirmation hearing and the high court itself, namely, Mario Matthew Cuomo. (Younger reads in need of a primer on the first Governor Cuomo should read It Is Still A Terrible Thing to Fall into the Hands of the Living God.) Byron White’s seat on the Supreme Court of the United States of America was his for the taking, something that I wrote about on at least two occasions at the time in The Wanderer in March and April of 1993.
A retrospective about William Jefferson Blythe Clinton’s efforts to name Mario Pilate/Pontius Cuomo to the Supreme Court was written by a former aide to the arrogantly sanctimonious three-term Governor of the State of New York shortly after Cuomo the Elder’s death on January 1, 2015:
On March 19, 1993, Byron White, who had been President Kennedy’s first appointment to the Supreme Court, announced his intention to retire. He had been thoughtful enough to wait until a new Democratic President was in office. That new President, Bill Clinton, had long known whom he wanted for his first appointment. He wanted Mario Cuomo, then sixty-one years old and nearing the end of his third term as governor of New York. And no wonder.
Think about it, as Clinton surely did. Think of how Cuomo would have dominated the Court with the force of his personality, his charm, his humor, and his extraordinary energy and capacity for work. Think of the negotiating and cajoling skills he had honed, first as a community lawyer navigating the shoals of race and class and then as a Democratic governor dealing with impatient liberals and a Republican state senate in a time of inescapable fiscal austerity. Think above all of his mesmerizing command of language—in conversation, in debate, and on the page. (Antonin Scalia, Cuomo’s fellow Italian-American Catholic, has a reputation as the Court’s foremost intellectual. Justice Cuomo would have made short work of him.)
Cuomo could be firm and forceful about policy and philosophy, but he was a legendary ditherer when it came to decisions about his own future. The White House made its proffer on March 30th, and what followed was two weeks of back-and-forth between Clinton, through his aide George Stephanopoulos, and Cuomo, through his son Andrew. As Stephanopoulos writes in “All Too Human,” his White House memoir, various versions of their pas de deux started to leak; the clock was running out. On April 7, I called Andrew. “We have to pull the trigger one way or another,” I told him. “It can’t go on like this. It’s not fair to the president. We need an answer.”
Andrew called his father, and he told me later that they spoke for two and a half hours. The White House needed a decision by day’s end, and Mario finally told Andrew, “If you want me to, I’ll call Clinton and take it.” But an hour later, the governor faxed the president a letter saying that his duty to New York outweighed his desire to be on the Supreme Court. Another chapter in the saga of Clinton and Cuomo had drawn to a close.
The saga didn’t end there, though. Clinton didn’t have a second choice, and it took him two months to settle on one. Many were considered: professors (Laurence Tribe, Michael Sandel, Stephen Carter); politicians (Bruce Babbitt, ex-governor of Arizona and Clinton’s interior secretary); lower-court judges (Stephen Breyer, José Cabranes); even a First Lady (Hillary Rodham Clinton). Eventually he decided on Ruth Bader Ginsburg. But, before he could offer her the post, Andrew Cuomo called Stephanopoulos. Was it still unfilled? If it was, Andrew said, and if the President offered it, this time the governor would accept. “Mario will do it because the President wants him to,” Andrew said. “But the President really has to put it to him. Unless he puts it to him, he won’t do it. He needs to use strong language, has to tell Mario that he has to do it.”
Late on the night of June 13, Andrew called again to reassure Stephanopoulos that Mario was still “on board.” A personal telephone call from Clinton to Cuomo was set for 6 P.M. the next day. At 5:45, Stephanopoulos was called to the phone. The governor was on the line. Yet again, he had changed his mind. “I surrender so many opportunities of service if I take the Court. I feel that I would abandon what I have to do. I don’t want the President to think that I might say yes.” Stephanopoulos was stunned. Recovering himself, he said, “I have to see the President. Let me be clear: If he calls you, you will not accept. Will you turn the President down?” “Yes.” (Hamlet on the Hudson and the Supreme Court.)
It was only after Mario Matthew Cuomo’s typical dithering about major decisions (he had two private planes waiting to take him and the press from Albany, New York, to Concord, New Hampshire, on December 21, 1991, to file papers for the 1992 Democratic Party presidential primary in the Granite State before deciding at the last minute not to do so: see Cuomo Says He Will Not Run for President in 1992) that the Slick Willie turned his attention to Ruth Bader Ginsburg:
Friday, Bill Clinton's presidential library released a new set of previously-restricted internal documents from his administration. One of those memos, from March of 1993, gives a fascinating glimpse into how Ruth Bader Ginsburg almost wasn't nominated for the Supreme Court.
The memo deals with a vacancy on the court that arose early in Clinton's first year, when Justice Byron "Whizzer" White announced his retirement. Soon afterward, Clinton had a meeting with advisers, and, as Jeffrey Toobin wrote in his book The Nine:
"Look," [Clinton] said, "the Court is totally fragmented and it's dominated by Republican appointees... It's not enough for someone to vote the right way," he said. "We've got to get someone who will move people, who will persuade the others to join them. It's what [Earl] Warren did. I want someone like that."
In that meeting, Clinton quickly decided that the person he wanted was... New York Governor Mario Cuomo.
But Supreme Court appointments are so important that the president needs to appear to consider several candidates, and get outside advice from others. So, in the newly-released memo, which was written three days after the meeting Toobin describes, Associate White House Counsel Ron Klain grapples with the challenge of making the administration seem to have an open mind.
"To what extent do we conduct a 'search' if the President has made up his mind?" Klain asked. "Do we cast a broad net for prospective candidates if the outcome is basically preordained?" The name of Clinton's choice is redacted in the memo, but it's clear from the reporting of Toobin and others that it was Cuomo. Here's the plan Klain laid out:
- Kiss Senate rears: Several important senators and particularly Judiciary Committee Chairman Joe Biden had made "their desire to be consulted" quite clear. "If we fail to do so," Klain wrote, "we will engender considerable ill-will towards our nominee."
- Make a diverse short list, containing some very liberal candidates, so it will be leaked: The list for these senators "should contain some names that will be even less desirable to conservatives than" Clinton's pick (Cuomo), the memo says. "It should also reflect geographic, gender, racial, and professional diversity. We should assume that the list, in its entirety, will be leaked to the press."
- Get women to cover you for not picking a woman: Klain suggests that Clinton call senators Dianne Feinstein and Carol Moseley-Braun because "we will need them to back us up if we do not choose a woman."
- Get a secret sneak preview of top lawyers' reaction: "Before we proceed with" Cuomo, Klain writes, "We should ask the ABA [American Bar Association] for a 24-hour 'read' on him: an informal process whereby they poll their Committee members and give us a 'sense' of their likely evaluation of him. This would be confidential on both sides (we could not disclose that we had done this), and would not prevent the ABA from issuing a lower rating later."
The White House effectively offered the nomination to Cuomo a few days later, but he couldn't decide whether to accept it. He delayed answering for several days, before briefly saying yes but then sending a letter withdrawing his name from consideration.
After several other possibilities were explored, without success, Clinton finally decided to ask his rarely-consulted attorney general, Janet Reno, for advice. "Why aren't you people looking at Ruth Bader Ginsburg?" she asked. Ginsburg soon impressed Clinton, and he decided to nominate her for the seat — though not before Cuomo returned to the picture one more time. (Clinton Memo on the Supreme Court.)
Thus it was that the late Janet “See No Evil” Reno, a pro-abortion Catholic, recommended Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who was perhaps the most pro-abortion jurist in the history of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, to Bill Clinton, after another pro-abortion Catholic, Mario Matthew Cuomo, turned down a chance to go to his grave with that distinction, although Cuomo did go to his grave as a publicly unrepentant support of the surgical execution of the preborn and of perversity, something that is a “distinction” only in the eyes of the adversary and his minions.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Confirmation Hearings
The late Ruth Bader Ginsburg was highly intelligent. However, she used the intelligence that had been given her gratuitously by God to propagate jurisprudential theories and approaches contrary to the Divine Positive Law and the Natural Law and thus detrimental to the good of men and their nations.
Consider the exchange she had with United States Senator George Hanks Brown (R-Colorado), who was himself a complete pro-abort, as the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary held her confirmation hearings in July of 1993:
Senator BROWN. I can see how the equal protection argument would apply to a policy that interfered with her plan to bear the child. Could that argument be applied for someone who wished to have the option of an abortion as well? Does it apply both to the decision to not have an abortion, as well as the decision to have an abortion, to terminate the pregnancy?
Judge GlNSBURG. The argument was, it was her right to decide either way, her right to decide whether or not to bear a child. (Ginsburg Confirmation Hearings, 1993.)
Look at what passes for “jurisprudence” in Modernity. No one but no one has the right to “decide” to kill an innocent human being. Yet it is that the then fifty-three year-old Senator Hank, as he called himself, Brown, and the nearly sixty year-old Ruth Bader Ginsburg were in complete agreement that a mother had a “right” to “decide” that which is beyond the moral authority of humans to decide.
A child belongs in a mother’s womb as the natural fruit of that for which God joins men and women into Holy Matrimony, and no utilitarian considerations, including physical or mental deformities in the preborn child nor medical burdens faced by the mother, can be justified morally and thus can never receive the sanction of the civil law legitimately.
Ginsburg had expiated on her theory of constitutional interpretation in an exchange with another pro-abort on the Senate Judiciary Committee, United States Senator Arlen Specter (D-R-D, Pennyslvania), whose support for the chemical and surgical execution of innocent preborn babies has been documented many times on this site (see, for example, Blame George Walker Bush):
Senator SPECTER: When you commented in the Washington Law Quarterly to this effect: "A boldly dynamic interpretation, departing radically from the original understanding, is required to tie to the 14th amendment's equal protection clause, a command that Government treat men and women as individuals, equals in rights and responsibilities and opportunities." And then concluding, referring to the judicial anxiety, the "uneasiness judges feel in the gray zone between interpretation and alteration of the Constitution." And after that unduly lengthy introduction, the narrow question I have for you is: Is it the role of the courts to upset decisions of legislators based on the jurist's own ideas about enlightened policy by bold, dynamic interpretation of the Constitution?
Judge GlNSBURG. Senator Specter, may I first join in what the chairman has said, what your colleagues have said. I am so pleased that you showed the care and concern to be here and that you are looking so well.
Senator SPECTER. Judge Ginsburg, you were an inspiration to me, hastened my recovery. There was a real motivation.
The CHAIRMAN [Joseph Robinette Biden, Jr., the by way]. Judge, there is no possibility we could hold a major hearing and Senator Specter not be here.
Judge GINSBURG. I could also say that I believe Marbury v. Madison (1803) was rightly decided. I said already yesterday that Dred Scott (1857) was wrong the day it was issued. There was no justification for it.
Senator SPECTER. I am glad to hear you say that because one nominee would not affirm Marbury v. Madison, and one nominee in the discussion in my office said, when I started off talking about Marbury v. Madison, "You know, Senator, that case wasn't very well reasoned." And I said, "No, I didn't know that."
Judge GINSBURG. Then I would also like to say that I prize the institution of judicial review for constitutionality. We have become a model for the world in that respect, and that is one of the reasons why I resist labels like "activism" and "restraint." I think it is a very precious institution that we have, and it should not be abused. After World War II, nations in other parts of the world that never had judicial review for constitutionality as part of their tradition adopted models compatible with their own systems but inspired by what our Supreme Court has been in our society. That role needs to be guarded; it should be exercised with great care. Now, the Washington University Law Quarterly article you mentioned was about the need for, or utility of an equal rights amendment. Why do we need an equal rights amendment when so many people have said the equal protection clause suffices? That was the topic of that article, was it not?
Senator SPECTER. Judge Ginsburg, it went beyond that, and it went to the point about having the Court extend what you categorized as a host of rights. It really was more in line with a statement you made at the second circuit judicial conference in 1976, where you put it this way: "The Supreme Court, by dynamic interpretation of the equal protection principle, could have done everything we asked today," and then, as an advocate, you had articulated a number of rights which you were looking for. So that I think it was beyond ratification of ERA. It was in your role as an advocate.
Judge GINSBURG. I don't know if my article in the Washington University Law Quarterly is here. I do recall the second circuit conference, and I do know that was a conference focused on the need for the utility of an equal rights amendment. I recall that that was a debate with Gloria Steinem and myself on one side and two gentlemen on the other side. 189 The Washington University Law Quarterly article, which somebody is going to try to get for me, was part of a series in the Washington University in St. Louis on the topic of equality. My specific topic was gender discrimination. I think the title indicated that the article dealt with the equal protection clause and the equal rights amendment as safeguards of the fair and equal treatment of women in our society. Senator SPECTER. Judge Ginsburg, the title is "Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments."
Judge GINSBURG. Right. That is
Senator SPECTER. The 14th amendment as well.
Judge GINSBURG. Right, yes. The article contrasted having an Equal Rights Amendment as distinguished from the equal protection clause as a guarantee of the equal citizenship of women before the law.
Senator SPECTER. Let us give you a copy of the article. We have an extra here.
Judge GINSBURG. Yes. This article is, as I said, an article in a symposium on the quest for equality. There was one on race, one on equal employment opportunity, one devoted to sexual equality under the 14th amendment and the Equal Rights Amendment. That article, like the Second Circuit Judicial Conference talk, focused on two things: the equal protection clause as a guarantee of the equal citizenship of women versus the Equal Rights Amendment. That was the entire context of the article, and what I said there was this: It is part of our history—a sad part of our history, Senator Specter, but undeniably part of our history—that the 14th amendment, that great amendment that changed so much in this Nation, was not intended by its framers immediately to change the status of women. And it is part of history that the leading feminists of the day—Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucretia Mott—campaigned against ratification of the 14th amendment because it allowed a system to persist in the United States where women couldn't vote, they couldn't hold office, if they married they couldn't hold property in their own name, they couldn't contract for themselves. That is what life was like for women in the middle of the 19th century. Times changed, and eventually, after nearly a century of struggle, women achieved the vote. They became full citizens. And many people thought that when women became full citizens, entitled to the vote, they had achieved equality. The vote should have qualified women as full and equal citizens with men, entitled to the same equal protection before the laws. The position was that, yes, it took bold and dynamic interpretation in view of what the framers of the 14th amendment intended. The framers of the 14th amendment meant no change, they intended no change at all in the status of women before the law. But in 1920, when women achieved the vote, they became full citizens, and you have to read the Constitution as a whole, changed, as Thurgood Marshall said, over the years by amendment and by judicial construction. So it was certainly a bold change from the middle of the 19th century until the 1970's when women's equal citizenship was recognized before the law. (Ginsburg Confirmation Hearings, 1993.)
In other words, the late Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg believed, in effect, that the Constitution is whatever we say it as to use a “strict constructionist” standard of judicial interpretation would be to “imprison” everyone, especially women, in historical conditions that have changed dramatically.
Leaving aside Ginsburg’s full-throated feminist view of women that is a revolutionary overturning of the nature of their complementary relationship to men as intended by God for a bit of review later in this brief commentary, suffice it for the moment to note that she saw herself as trail blazer in using the Constitution as a blank tablet upon which could be written whatever a judge believed was good for society at the time. Justice Ginsburg was very cautious in how she expressed this in the colloquies with the members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, but she more than amply proved that she was a “living constitutionalist” along the lines of the late Associate Justice William Brennan during her twenty-seven years on the Supreme Court of the United States of America.
Here is an excerpt of the pro-abortion William Brennan’s “living constitution” approach to judicial interpretation that is identical to the late Karol Josef Wojtyla/John Paul II’s “living tradition” and Joseph Alois Ratzinger/Benedict XVI’s “hermeneutic of continuity” approaches to dogmatic interpretation that were nothing other than euphemisms for dogmatic evolutionism:
To remain faithful to the content of the Constitution, therefore, an approach to interpreting the text must account for the existence of these substantive value choices, and must accept the ambiguity inherent in the effort to apply them to modern circumstances. The Framers discerned fundamental principles through struggles against particular malefactions of the Crown; the struggle shapes the particular contours of the articulated principles. But our acceptance of the fundamental principles has not and should not bind us to those precise, at times anachronistic, contours. Successive generations of Americans have continued to respect these fundamental choices and adopt them as their own guide to evaluating quite different historical practices. Each generation has the choice to overrule or add to the fundamental principles enunciated by the Framers; the Constitution can be amended or it can be ignored. Yet with respect to its fundamental principles, the text has suffered neither fate. Thus, if I may borrow the words of an esteemed predecessor, Justice Robert Jackson, the burden of judicial interpretation is to translate "the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth century." Board of Education v. Barnette, [319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943),] We current Justices read the Constitution in the only way that we can: as Twentieth Century Americans. We look to the history of the time of framing and to the intervening history of interpretation. But the ultimate question must be, what do the words of the text mean in our time. For the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs. What the constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be their measure to the vision of our time. Similarly, what those fundamentals mean for us, our descendants will learn, cannot be the measure to the vision of their time. This realization is not, I assure you, a novel one of my own creation. Permit me to quote from one of the opinions of our Court, Weems v. United States, [217 U.S. 349,] written nearly a century ago:
"Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore, a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, 'designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.' The future is their care and provision or events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophesy can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be."
Interpretation must account for the transformative purpose of the text. Our Constitution was not intended to preserve a preexisting society but to make a new one, to put in place new principles that the prior political community had not sufficiently recognized. Thus, for example, when we interpret the Civil War Amendments to the charter—abolishing slavery, guaranteeing blacks equality under law, and guaranteeing blacks the right to vote—we must remember that those who put them in place had no desire to enshrine the status quo. Their goal was to make over their world, to eliminate all vestige of slave caste. ("Constitutional Interpretation" by Justice William J. Brennan.)
William Brennan, a Catholic who cast one of the seven votes in favor of the Supreme Court decisions in the cases of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, January 22, 1973, believed what Ruth Bader Ginsburg believed. He believed what Associate Justices Elena Kagan, Stephen Breyer, and Sonya Sotomayor believe today. Chief Justice John Glover Roberts, Jr., is simply a political jurist who lets expediency guide him according to his own abitrary reasoning.
Despite all the talk in 1993 and more recently after her death, Ruth Bader Ginsburg was unqualified to serve on the Supreme Court of the United States of America as no one who supports the execution of an innocent human being, whether before or after birth, under the cover of the civil law is qualified to hold any position of public trust in any governmental position, whether elected or appointed, including, to quote the words of the late Dr. Charles E. Rice, who must have been, I presume, a mentor of Ginsburg’s putative successor, Judge Amy Coney Barrett, serving as a “trustee on a mosquito abatement district.”
Any candidate who believes that the law should treat any innocent human beings as nonpersons by tolerating their execution is unworthy to hold any public office, whether President, trustee of a mosquito abatement district, or senator. (Dr. Charles E. Rice, "Pro-Life Reflections on Sen. D'Amato, The Wanderer, August 27, 1998.)
Only three Republicans—United States Senators Donald Nickles, R-Oklahoma, Jesse Helms, R-North Carolina, Robert Smith, R-New Hampshire—opposed Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s confirmation on the floor of the United States Senate on August 5, 1993. Three. Just three. Although Democrats controlled the United States Senate at that time under the leadership of a pro-abortion Catholic from Maine, United States Senator George Mitchell, thus making Ginsburg’s confirmation a certainty no matter what the Republicans did, only three had the courage to oppose Ginsburg because she was an open supporter of baby-killing, thus exposing the farce that is the term “pro-life” legislator and the farce that is “bi-partisanship” exercised in the advancement of evil.
Ginsburg on the Court
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s pro-abortion record speaks for itself, and it has been lauded by her legions (emphasis on “legions”) of “RBG” followers. There is no such thing as “reproductive rights” and the killing of an innocent preborn baby is not a matter of “healthcare.” There are no “decisions” to be made, only love to be given.
Ginsburg did, however, point out some of the hypocrisies of the professional “right-to-life” movement that tried to use the issue dilation and extraction (partial birth or crushed skull abortion) as a “wedge issue” for political purposes knowing full well that there remained two other methods—dilation and evacuation and the hysterotomy—to kill babies in the later stages of pregnancy that have remained perfectly legal in the wake of Carhart v. Gonzales, April 17, 2007.
Carhart v. Gonzales came to the Supreme Court of the United States of America after the Congress of the United States of America had passed a bill on November 5, 2003, to ban crushed skull abortions except in the cases of the life and the health of the mother.
This bill was timed to pass came late in the third year of President George Walker Bush’s presidency so that it could not be taken up by the Supreme Court of the United States of America in its 2003-2004 term, making it a useful political issue for the Bush the Warmonger without having to answer to pro-life voters if the Court struck the bill down during a presidential election year as had happened four years earlier in the case of Sternberg v. Carhart as a similar but not identical Nebraska statute had been deemed unconstitutional by a high court vote of 5-4 on June 28, 2000.
Associate Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion in the Sternberg case that, while correctly pointing out that the Nebraska statute would not prevent the destruction of “fetuses” given the existence of the other two methods available for baby-killers to execute children in the second and third trimesters of their development in their mothers’ wombs, was premised upon her adamant insistence that the civil state can do nothing to impede a woman’s nonexistent right before God to kill her baby:
I write separately only to stress that amidst all the emotional uproar caused by an abortion case, we should not lose sight of the character of Nebraska’s “partial birth abortion” law. As the Court observes, this law does not save any fetus from destruction, for it targets only “a method of performing abortion.” Ante, at 11—12. Nor does the statute seek to protect the lives or health of pregnant women. Moreover, as Justice Stevens points out, ante, at 1 (concurring opinion), the most common method of performing previability second trimester abortions is no less distressing or susceptible to gruesome description. Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Posner correspondingly observed, regarding similar bans in Wisconsin and Illinois, that the law prohibits the D&X procedure “not because the procedure kills the fetus, not because it risks worse complications for the woman than alternative procedures would do, not because it is a crueler or more painful or more disgusting method of terminating a pregnancy.” Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 881 (CA7 1999) (dissenting opinion). Rather, Chief Judge Posner commented, the law prohibits the procedure because the State legislators seek to chip away at the private choice shielded by Roe v. Wade, even as modified by Casey. Id., at 880—882.
A state regulation that “has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus” violates the Constitution. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). Such an obstacle exists if the State stops a woman from choosing the procedure her doctor “reasonably believes will best protect the woman in [the] exercise of [her] constitutional liberty.” Ante, at 1 (Stevens, J., concurring); see Casey, 505 U.S., at 877 (“means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it”). Again as stated by Chief Judge Posner, “if a statute burdens constitutional rights and all that can be said on its behalf is that it is the vehicle that legislators have chosen for expressing their hostility to those rights, the burden is undue.” Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d, at 881. (Sternberg v. Carhart, tJune 28, 2000.)
There is no such thing as “potential life” as there would be no need to engage in what Ginsburg called the “destruction of fetuses” if they were not alive, and to be alive they have to have their own DNA, which is by definition separate and distinct from that of their mothers. Terms such as “potential life” have been coined to dehumanize a preborn baby. Moreover, Dr. Ralph Northam, the Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the state legislatures of Virginia, New York, Rhode Island and elsewhere, have enacted laws to assure that a baby who is born in the act of any kind late-term abortion can be filled. So much for “potential life.” So much for Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s legal expertise. She was a Sophist of the highest order who was concerned about protecting a moral evil that has taken the lives of over sixty million children by surgical means and countless hundreds of millions more by chemical means in the past forty-seven years.
Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented in the Carhart v. Gonzales case seven years later that upheld the constitutionality of the November 5, 2003, Congressional partial ban on crushed skull abortions even though there was a “health of the mother exception” (something through which the proverbial Mack truck can be driven as “health” can be defined so broadly as to include having a bad “mental health day” and, very fundamentally, there is never an exception to the binding precepts of the Fifth Commandments or those of the Natural Law that forbid the direct, intentional taking of an innocent human being’s life) because she believed the act trampled upon women’s “rights”:
Though today's opinion does not go so far as to discard Roe or Casey, the Court, differently composed than it was when we last considered a restrictive abortion regulation, is hardly faithful to our earlier invocations of "the rule of law" and the "principles of stare decisis." Congress imposed a ban despite our clear prior holdings that the State cannot proscribe an abortion procedure when its use is necessary to protect a woman's health. See supra, at 7, n. 4. Although Congress' findings could not withstand the crucible of trial, the Court defers to the legislative override of our Constitution-based rulings. See supra, at 7-9. A decision so at odds with our jurisprudence should not have staying power.
In sum, the notion that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act furthers any legitimate governmental interest is, quite simply, irrational. The Court's defense of the statute provides no saving explanation. In candor, the Act, and the Court's defense of it, cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to chip away at a right declared again and again by this Court--and with increasing comprehension of its centrality to women's lives. See supra, at 3, n. 2; supra, at 7, n. 4. When "a statute burdens constitutional rights and all that can be said on its behalf is that it is the vehicle that legislators have chosen for expressing their hostility to those rights, the burden is undue." Stenberg, 530 U. S., at 952 (GINSBURG, J., concurring) (quoting Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F. 3d 857, 881 (CA7 1999) (Posner, C. J., dissenting)). (Carhart v. Gonzales, April 18, 2007.)
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s criterion of “fidelity” to the “rule of law” and to stare decisis, which has no standing in the court of Christ the King, is based upon the fundamentally false and anthropocentric belief that mere men, whose bodies are destined one day for the grave until the General Judgment of the living and the dead on the Last Day, have the moral authority to release men from the binding precepts of the Divine Positive Law and the Natural Law and to consider their own manufactured prescriptions as infallible “precedents” that must be followed without dissent in perpetuity without any kind of alternation or equivocation. Although I know I wrote the following earlier in this commentary, let me do so again: the law is whatever we say it is, especially when it refers to the “right to privacy” that ensures an unlimited array of sensual pleasures without consequences of any kind as the existence for human life. Licentious must replaced an authentic rule of law based upon a firm and unyielding adherence to the binding precepts of God in order that appertains to the good of souls.
One who has no regard for the laws of God, not that Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a Talmudist, cared about those, of course, will easily throw away any regard for the actual words of a written constitution and statute laws, including those laws passed by state legislatures that seek to “regulate” the conditions under which babies may be killed. The fact that the “best” that some state legislatures can do is to seek to regulate abortuaries is itself a monumental testament to the fallibility of governmental systems that are not founded in a due regard for—and submission to—the binding precepts of the Divine Positive Law and the Natural Law in all that pertains to the good of souls and thus to the common temporal good of nations.
Alas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s commitment to abortion was not matter of her innate “feminism” or her belief in a “bold, dynamic” misinterpretation of the words of the Constitution of the United States of America. Ruth Bader Ginsburg was a eugenicist of the sort that would have made Margaret Sanger and her judicial ally on the Supreme Court of the United States of America at the time, Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, burst with pride:
Five years ago [in 2009], Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said the most fascinating thing in a candid interview with Sunday New York Times Magazine reporter Emily Bazelon:
Frankly I had thought that at the time Roe was decided, there was concern about population growth and particularly growth in populations that we don’t want to have too many of.
Excuse me? Populations that we don’t want to have too many of? Eugenics doesn’t really sound any better — indeed, it sounds a great deal worse — when it’s coming from a media-beloved Supreme Court Justice. My favorite part of the interview was that Bazelon didn’t even pause for a second. Just went on to her next question. Bazelon later said, unconvincingly, that she thought Ginsburg was just saying that other people had wanted Roe because they were eugenicists, or something. (Ruth Bader Ginsburg Really Wants Poor People to Stop Having Babies.)
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the late Mrs. Ginsburg was in the majority three months ago when the Supreme Court of the United States of America struck down a Louisiana law similar to the one that had been struck down in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, June 27, 2016, in the case of June Medical Services v. Russo, June 29, 2020, which featured a concurring decision by the quisling named Chief Justice John Glover Roberts, who had voted to uphold the Texas statute in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt that was, by his own admission, indistinguishable from the Louisiana law that he voted with Associate Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonya Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan to strike down (see Stare Decisis Has No Standing in the Court of Christ the King). She was also in the majority in the three major sodomite “rights” cases in the past seven years, Windsor v. New York, June 26, 2013, and Obergefell v. Hodges, June 26, 2015, joining the Court’s opinion as written by the since retired Associate Justice Anthony MacLeod Kennedy in each of those occasions. Justice Ginsburg also joined Court’s opinion in case of Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, June 15, 2020, which was written by none other than Associate Justice Neil Gorsuch (see Jurisprudential Social Engineering), that expanded the meaning of Title IX of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 to apply to mutants who have had their bodies chemically and surgically altered in the false belief that doing so made them a different gender than that which is theirs by their birth, a reality that is immutable and undeniable except by the criminally insane, and/or those who simply consider themselves to be a member of the opposite gender.
The jurisprudence of the late Ruth Bader Ginsburg was summarized very accurately by the late Howard Phillips, the founder and the president of the Conservative Caucus Foundation, when he testified against Ginsburg’s confirmation on July 21, 1993:
My objections to Justice Souter were premised not only on his legal philosophy, but on his personal history of having facilitated the liberalization of abortion policies at two hospitals for which he was an overseer.
I presented facts which established without rebuttal that Mr. Souter's posture of neutrality on this great question of life and death was contradicted by his personal complicity in the performance of many hundreds of abortions at Concord Memorial Hospital and Dartmouth Hitchcock Hospital in New Hampshire.
I have no reason to believe that Mrs. Ginsburg has personally caused human lives to be extinguished, as was clearly the case with David Souter when President Bush put his name forward. Nor do I in any other way challenge Mrs. Ginsburg's nomination on grounds of personal character.
I do, however, urge that Mrs. Ginsburg's nomination be rejected by the Senate on grounds that the standard of judgment she would bring to the Supreme Court on the overriding issue of whether the Constitution protects our God-given right to life, is a wrong standard.
Instead of defending the humanity and divinely imparted right to life of pre-born children, she would simply be another vote for the proposition that our unborn children are less than human and that their lives may be snuffed out without due process of law, and with impunity.
As a matter of practice and belief, Mrs. Ginsburg has failed to acknowledge or recognize that the first duty of the law is indeed the defense of innocent human life.
If it is Mrs. Ginsburg's position—and it does seem to be her view—that the extinguishment of innocent unborn human lives, without due process of law, is not only Constitutionally permissible, but that those who engage in the practice of destroying unborn lives should enjoy Constitutional protection for doing so, she may have a perspective consistent with that held by members of this committee, but it is not one which is consistent with either the plain language of the Constitution or with the revulsion toward abortion which prevailed at the time when our Constitution was drafted and ratified.
While Mrs. Ginsburg has disagreed with the reasoning in Roe v. Wade, at no point has she expressed dissatisfaction with the millions of legal abortions which were facilitated by that decision, even though she would have argued that "discrimination" rather than "privacy" was the core issue.
By Mrs. Ginsburg's logic, it is unconstitutional discrimination to deny females the opportunity to extinguish any lives which may result from their sexual conduct. Her argument would seem to be with our Creator, inasmuch as he did not equally assign the same childbearing function to males. Consistent with her warped perspective, Mrs. Ginsburg, as a litigator, argued that pregnancy should be treated as a disability rather than as a gift from God.
Indeed, in a 1972 brief, Mrs. Ginsburg argued that "exaltation of woman's unique role in bearing children has, in effect, restrained women from developing their individual talents...and has impelled them to accept a dependent, subordinate status in society."1
Moreover, in 1984, in a speech at the University of North Carolina, Mrs. Ginsburg went so far as to maintain that the government has a legal "duty" to use taxpayer funds to subsidize abortion.
The question of personhood, and of the humanity of the pre-born child is at the very heart of the abortion issue—in law, in morals, and in fact.
Justice John Paul Stevens expressed his opinion in the 1986 Thornburgh case that "there is a fundamental and well-recognized difference between a fetus and a human being." He admitted that "indeed, if there is not such a difference, the permissibility of terminating the life of a fetus could scarcely be left to the will of the state legislatures."2
In the Roe v. Wade decision, the Supreme Court indicated that if the unborn child is a person, the State could not allow abortion, even to save the life of the mother. In fact, in the majority opinion deciding Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court said that, if the "personhood [of the unborn child] is established, [the pro-abortion] case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment."3
Although my reasoning is different, I agree with Justice Stevens when he argues that, if the unborn child is recognized as a human person, there is no Constitutional basis to justify Federal protection of abortion anywhere in the United States of America. Indeed, on the contrary, if the pre-born child is, in fact, a human person created in God's image, premeditated abortion is unconstitutional in every one of the fifty states.
Justice Stevens bases his reasoning on the Fourteenth Amendment. I base mine on Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution, which stipulates that "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government...." What distinguishes a republic from a democracy is the fact that, in our republic, due process protections of our God-given rights to life, liberty, and property cannot properly be snuffed out by legislative whim—whether reflected in the vote of a simple majority, a super majority of two-thirds or three-fourths, or even by unanimous vote.
Mrs. Ginsburg should be closely questioned by members of the Judiciary Committee concerning whether she believes the unborn child is a human person created in God's image.
If this is not her understanding (and it does not seem to be), she should be asked to indicate by what logic she reaches a contrary conclusion.
The Constitution of the United States accords this body the right to provide advice and consent with respect to the judicial nominees of the President. As I read the Constitution, you can confirm a nominee for any reason you choose. Moreover, you can reject a nominee for any reason you choose.
There are two categories of review which, in every case involving a nominee to our highest court, ought to be part of the confirmation process: One, is the nominee a person whose character, judgment, and ability is compatible with the office? A second factor to be considered in the case of Supreme Court nominees is whether the nominee can reasonably be expected to render judgement in a manner which is faithful to the Constitution, taking care to honor its specific words rather than to rely on interpretations of the Constitution which are clearly inconsistent with its plain meaning.
It has been reported4 concerning Mrs. Ginsburg that "Several of her writings provide a glimpse into her approach to the Constitution. In an article in Law and Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice, she wrote that `a too strict jurisprudence of the framers' original intent seems to me unworkable.' She went on to write that adherence to `our eighteenth century Constitution' is dependent on `change in society's practices, constitutional amendment, and judicial interpretation.' Furthermore, in the Washington University Law Quarterly, she remarked that `boldly dynamic interpretation departing radically from the original understanding' of the Constitution is sometimes necessary."5
"In a speech this March at New York University, Judge Ginsburg advocated using the Supreme Court to enact `social change.'....
"....without taking giant strides...the court, through constitutional adjudication, can reinforce or signal a green light for social change."6
It is not surprising that different people might reach different conclusions about the intent of the Framers. But it is quite another thing for a prospective Justice of the Supreme Court to presume to substitute his or her own opinion for the plain meaning of the original document as lawfully amended. I hope the members of the committee will probe more deeply into Mrs. Ginsburg's present view of the opinion she expressed in that article. If she is unwilling to repudiate it credibly and entirely, then, even aside from her apparent failure to recognize the duty of the state to safeguard innocent humanity, she would seem to have disqualified herself from a position in which she is expected to be a guardian of the Constitution. Otherwise, a vote to confirm Mrs. Ginsburg becomes a vote to empower a permanent one-woman Constitutional Convention which never goes out of session.
Indeed, in view of the position taken by Mrs. Ginsburg that it is the duty of Supreme Court justices to disregard the plain words and intentions of the Constitution, it is particularly important that her personal opinions be closely scrutinized.
As you know, it is the practice of judges below the Supreme Court level to indicate deference to the decisions of the Supreme Court, and to avoid the appearance of competing with the Supreme Court in breaking new Constitutional ground.
There are those who argue that Mrs. Ginsburg's performance as a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia stands in clear contrast with her role as advocate when she was in private practice and when she functioned as general counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union. But, it would be a mistake to conclude that Mrs. Ginsburg's performance on the Court of Appeals is evidence that she has abandoned her previous perspective or philosophy.
The clear problem is that, at least at one point, as a mature adult, a law school graduate and a seasoned attorney, Mrs. Ginsburg expressed the view that it was not only the privilege, but the duty, of Supreme Court Justices to become supreme legislators, supplanting the Founding Fathers in determining the scope and meaning of our organic law, the Constitution of the United States.
For this reason, Mrs. Ginsburg's views on virtually every subject which might conceivably be addressed by the Supreme Court are relevant to the consideration of this body.
Of course, it is my view that a Supreme Court nominee who sees her role as that of supreme legislator should, ipso facto, be disqualified. But, I have no doubt that there are many in this body who, presuming that they will agree with Mrs. Ginsburg's policy conclusions, intend to set aside any concerns they might have on that score.
It is, therefore, the particular obligation of those who might disagree with Mrs. Ginsburg's ideology and policy objectives to either oppose her nomination on the basis of such disagreement, or to henceforth cease their personal professions of conviction on those particular issues—whether they relate to abortion, to homosexuality, or to some other issue where Mrs. Ginsburg's philosophical predilections are a matter of public record.
For example, the records of the American Civil Liberties Union disclose that, Mrs. Ginsburg, as a member of the ACLU board, voted to oppose the authority of state governments to preserve laws prohibiting prostitution and homosexuality. She opposed the right of the Federal government to screen out homosexuals from the military, and she even attacked the right of state and local governments to arrest and prosecute adult sex offenders who prey upon the young.7
I would argue that those Senators who believe that states and communities have a right of self-defense against the threats to public health and public morals posed by homosexual conduct should act on their professed concerns by voting against the confirmation of Mrs. Ginsburg.
Similarly, if you sincerely believe that homosexual conduct is incompatible with military service, you cannot, conscientiously or consistently, vote to confirm Mrs. Ginsburg—because as an unelected Supreme Court legislator she could be expected to regularly vote to overturn not only your opinion but that of your constituents.
In the same vein, is it not clear that Mrs. Ginsburg's view of the Fourteenth Amendment would preclude any distinctions being drawn on the basis of gender with respect to the assignment of women to combat?
And whether or not Mrs. Ginsburg has expressed, or even developed, a clearly defined view on other issues of Constitutional import, I would suggest that they are worth raising—not just in terms of her philosophical conformity to prevailing opinion, but in seeking to discern her willingness to accord overriding consideration to the original intentions of the Framers.
This committee has, over the years, asked Supreme Court nominees questions in detail on a variety of subjects ranging from contraception to bilingual ballots, but it has not probed in depth the views of the nominees on other issues of Constitutional significance.
By way of illustration, this year, this Senate is scheduled to conduct hearings on the question of D.C. statehood. What is the opinion of the nominee with respect to Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which makes clear that, without Constitutional amendment, the District of Columbia must operate as a Federal city under the jurisdiction of laws approved by the Congress?
What is the opinion of the nominee with respect to the Second Amendment? On what basis does she believe that Congress may be authorized to restrict the right of the people to keep and bear arms? Would she concede that the people have a Constitutional right to effective self-defense by bearing arms—a right reserved to them under the Ninth Amendment as well as the Second?
How does the nominee interpret that provision in Article I, Section 8, which extends to Congress—not to the President, not to the GATT, and not to NAFTA—the authority to "regulate commerce"?
The Constitution gives Congress authority "to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures." Our Federal Reserve system is clearly inconsistent with this Constitutional provision. What is the nominee's conclusion concerning this?
The First Amendment says "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." Do not subsidies to educational and cultural entities inescapably involve the funding of activities which are religious in character? If so, is it not unconstitutional for the Federal government to subsidize such entities, even those which are purportedly secular?
Is it not in conflict with the First Amendment to require taxpayers to subsidize a National Endowment for the Arts, which underwrites some highly parochial views concerning the nature of God and man?
What is her opinion of the wanton destruction of human life in Waco, Texas and in Ruby Creek, Idaho initiated lawlessly by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and by the United States Department of Justice?
Is the nominee willing to literally apply the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, which states unequivocally that the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people?
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, Mrs. Ginsburg's nomination should be rejected:
As a Justice, she would not safeguard the God-given right to life. She would further subvert it. Freed of the constraints which tend to bind lower court judges to the decisions of the Supreme Court, we are obliged, on the record, to assume she would act on her belief that it is necessary to offer interpretations which depart radically from the original meaning of the Constitution. ( Howard Phillips Testimony on Ruth Bader Ginsburg, July 21, 1993.)
Ruth Bader Ginsburg was unqualified to serve in any position of government trust twenty-seven years ago, and while there were occasions when her decisions were just, including voting with a unanimous Court in numerous cases to strike down Barack Hussein Obama/Barry Soetoro’s executive order/directive/memoranda overreach—see Obama Lost More in the Supreme Court than Most Other Modern Presidents Prior to Him) despite being reasoned erroneously (see my February 26, 2003, commentary in the printed pages of Christ or Chaos about the Court’s decision in the case of Joseph Scheidler v. National Organization of Women, December 4, 2002, in the Appendix below), it is simply wrong to praise her in death for doing in life what was repugnant in the sight of the true God of Divine Revelation, the Most Blessed Trinity, and thus harmful to individual souls and thus of all social order.
The Greatest Ruth Bader Tragedy of Them All
The greatest tragedy involving Ruth Bader Ginsburg is that died outside the bosom of Holy Mother Church after a six decade long career in behalf of one false principle after another, including using the courts as instruments to advance that are grave moral evils in the objective order of things. Truth does not depend upon human acceptance for its binding force or validity and it matters not that large majorities of people may reject its validity or that only a handful people accept it. Truth is. Truth exists. Ruth Bader Ginsburg was a modern woman, a veritable Eve in judicial robes who long ago succumbed to the allure of the adversary through her false religion, Talmudism, to believe in one subjectivist, relativist, positivist fable after another. Truth to her was whatever she believed it to be.
Sadly, tragically, her good friend and Supreme Court sparring partner, the late Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, never tried to influence Ruth Bader Ginsburg in any way, including attempting to convert her to the Catholic Faith, which would have led her to baptismal font, whereupon her immortal soul would have been freed from Original Sin and the enlightened and enlivened with the very life of the Most Blessed Trinity that is Sanctifying Grace. No effort was ever made to give her a blessed Miraculous Medal or a blessed Green Scapular. Their friendship revolved around a love of the opera and other shared interests, including a fundamental respect for the blasphemous Talmud that Scalia, who stated publicly in Rome, Santa Paula, California, and in New York, New York, in 1997 within my own hearing that the Natural Law was irrelevant to his judicial decision-making as he was bound to the words of the Constitution and nothing else, actually referenced it in (and other Jewish sources) in Court decisions now and again.
Here are two examples:
Talmudic sages believed that judges who accepted bribes would be punished by eventually losing all knowledge of the divine law. The Federal Government, dealing with many public officials who are not judges, and with at least some judges for whom this sanction holds no terror, has constructed a framework of human laws and regulations defining various sorts of impermissible gifts, and punishing those who give or receive them with administrative sanctions, fines, and incarceration. One element of that framework is 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A), the “illegal gratuity statute,” which prohibits giving “anything of value” to a present, past, or future public official “for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official.” In this case, we consider whether conviction under the illegal gratuity statute requires any showing beyond the fact that a gratuity was given because of the recipient’s official position. (United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, April 27, 1999.)
A Talmudic maxim instructs with respect to the Scripture: “Turn it over, and turn it over, for all is therein.” The Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Aboth, Ch. V, Mishnah 22 (I. Epstein ed. 1935). Divinely inspired text may contain the answers to all earthly questions, but the Due Process Clause most assuredly does not. The Court today continues its quixotic quest to right all wrongs and repair all imperfections through the Constitution. Alas, the quest cannot succeed—which is why some wrongs and imperfections have been called nonjusticiable. In the best of all possible worlds, should judges sometimes recuse even where the clear commands of our prior due process law do not require it? Undoubtedly. The relevant question, however, is whether we do more good than harm by seeking to correct this imperfection through expansion of our constitutional mandate in a manner ungoverned by any discernable rule. The answer is obvious. (Caperton v. A. T. Massy Coal Company, June 8, 2009.)
Antonin Scalia took the time and trouble to familiarize himself with the blasphemous Talmud and other Jewish sources of law but could never trouble himself to refer to the Natural Law nor to refer to his friend, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to the liberating truth that is found only in the Catholic Church, outside of which there is no salvation and without which there can be no true social order.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg thus came face to face with the terrible fate that awaited magistrates who were responsible for supporting the slaughter of the innocent preborn as described by Pope Pius XI in Casti Connubii, December 31, 1930, without ever having received the benefit of a friendly admonition from her friend and fellow jurist, Scalia:
Those who hold the reins of government should not forget that it is the duty of public authority by appropriate laws and sanctions to defend the lives of the innocent, and this all the more so since those whose lives are endangered and assailed cannot defend themselves. Among whom we must mention in the first place infants hidden in the mother's womb. And if the public magistrates not only do not defend them, but by their laws and ordinances betray them to death at the hands of doctors or of others, let them remember that God is the Judge and Avenger of innocent blood which cried from earth to Heaven. (Pope Pius XI, Casti Connubii, December 30, 1930.)
Although I prayed to Saint Peregrine for Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s healing from cancer and for her conversion to the true Faith before she did, I am not praying for her soul now as she died an unrepentant and unreconstructed Talmudist who betrayed the blood of the innocent and who reaffirmed sinners steeped in perverse acts that also cry out to Heaven for vengeance. It is always a terrible thing to fall into the hands of the living God, especially if one is unprepared to meet Him after never knowing Him during his life.
Lest we become haughty in the manner of the lords of Modernism and Modernity, however, we must always recognize that it is indeed a terrible thing for any of us to fall into the hands of the living God:
 For if we sin wilfully after having the knowledge of the truth, there is now left no sacrifice for sins,  But a certain dreadful expectation of judgment, and the rage of a fire which shall consume the adversaries.  A man making void the law of Moses, dieth without any mercy under two or three witnesses:  How much more, do you think he deserveth worse punishments, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, by which he was sanctified, and hath offered an affront to the Spirit of grace?  For we know him that hath said: Vengeance belongeth to me, and I will repay. And again: The Lord shall judge his people.
 It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God. (Hebrews 10: 26-31.)
It is indeed a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God. Each of us must remember this truth, contained in Saint Paul the Apostle's Epistle to the Hebrews. We are, after all, in the penitential season of Lent, a time during which we must call to mind the horror of our sins as we seek to live more penitentially so as to make reparation for them to the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus through the Sorrowful and Immaculate Heart of Mary. Our Lord us that we do not know the day or the hour of the time He will visit us at the moment of our deaths:
Be you then also ready: for at what hour you think not, the Son of man will come. (Luke 12: 40.)
Many of us have much for which to answer. I know that I do!
The hour of Our Blessed Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ's visitation is something for which we must ask His Most Blessed Mother to prepare us each and every day as we examine our consciences nightly and make a perfect Act of Contrition in the morning and before we go to sleep, availing ourselves of the Mercy of the Divine Redeemer on a weekly basis, if at all possible, in the Sacred Tribunal of Penance. We must never seek to minimize our sins or the debt that we owe to God for them.
It is, however, one thing to sin and to be sorry for one's sins as one seeks to live penitentially in reparation for them. It is quite another to persist in sin and/or the support for grave sins unrepentantly until the moment of of one's death, which is what so many pro-abortion Catholics who have served in public office have been able to do while maintaining their "good standing" in the structures of the counterfeit church of conciliarism.
May Our Lady help us to manifest the Sacred Rights of Christ the King at all times, keeping ever close to the mysteries of salvation contained in the fifteen decades of her Most Holy Rosary.
The Caligulas and the Neros and the Trajans and the Valerians and the Diocletians and the Cromwells and the Bismarcks and the French Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks and the Maoists all come and go. They have met the moment of their Particular Judgment. In the end, you see, these figures, much like the petty caesars and caesarettes of today, are forgettable figures, especially when you consider these words that Our Blessed Lord and Saviour, Christ the King, Himself spoke to Saint Margaret Mary Alacoque:
"I will reign in spite of all who oppose Me." (quoted in: The Right Reverend Emile Bougaud. The Life of Saint Margaret Mary Alacoque, reprinted by TAN Books and Publishers in 1990, p. 361.)
Yes, Viva Cristo Rey!
Our Lady of the Rosary, pray for us!
Saint Joseph, pray for us.
Saints Peter and Paul, pray for us.
Saint John the Baptist, pray for us.
Saint John the Evangelist, pray for us.
Saint Michael the Archangel, pray for us.
Saint Gabriel the Archangel, pray for us.
Saint Raphael the Archangel, pray for us.
Saints Joachim and Anne, pray for us.
Saints Caspar, Melchior, and Balthasar, pray for us.
Pope Saint Linus I, pray for us.
Saint Thecla, pray for us.
Justice for a Pro-Life Hero, February 26, 2003
(from the printed pages of Christ or Chaos)
Cliches are cliches because they contain undeniable truisms. One cliche goes something like this: "Even a blind mouse can find cheese now and then," meaning that it is possible for otherwise dense people to stumble upon actual facts and to assess them honesty.
The 8-1 decision in the case of Scheidler et al. v. National Organization for Women, Inc., rendered exactly twelve weeks after oral arguments were heard by the justices of the United States Supreme Court on December 4, 2002, is a reminder that even the highest court in this land can still get it right now and then. Indeed, even five out of the six pro-aborts on the Court (Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer) read the law correctly, an amazing phenomenon explicable only by the countless numbers of prayers offered by millions of people that justice would prevail in this case.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice William Rehnquist noted that Joe Scheidler was not engaged in rackeetering as that term is properly defined by the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act nor was he guilty of "extorting property" as a "bandit" from abortuaries as defined by the Hobbs Act, which was passed by the United States Congress in 1946. Rehnquist went to great lengths to define what constitutes extortion and the "taking of property," explaining that those who were protesting in front of abortuaries may have prevented abortions from taking place but that they did not profit themselves from their activities, which were political in nature. Addressing himself specifically to the Hobbs Act, Rehnquist wrote:
"But even when their acts of interference and disruption achieved their ultimate goal of 'shutting down' a clinic that performed abortions, such acts did not constitute extortion because petitioners did not 'obtain' respondents' property. Petitioners may have deprived or sought to deprive respondents of their alleged property right of exclusive control of their business assets, but they did not acquire any such property. Petitioners neither pursued nor received 'something of value from' respondents that they could exercise, transfer, or sell."
The lone dissenter, Associate Justice John Paul Stevens, who was appointed to the Court by President Gerald R. Ford to replace William O. Douglas in 1975, disagreed. He would have given the broadest possible interpretation to the "taking of property" provision of the Hobbs Act, an interpretation that was articulated by the Solicitor General of the United States, Theodore Olson, in his amicus curiae brief submitted in this case. As an unrepentant legal positivist, Stevens noted that courts should have wide latitude to interpret the language of statutes as they see fit:
"For decades federal judges have uniformly given the term 'property' an expansive construction that encompasses the intangible right to exercise exclusive control over the lawful use of business assets. The right to serve customers or to solicit new business is thus a protected property right. The use of violence or threats of violence to persuade the owner of a business to surrender control of such an intangible right is an appropriation of control embraced by the term 'obtaining.' That is the commonsense reading of the statute that other federal judges have consistently and wisely embraced in numerous cases that the Court does not discuss or even cite. Recognizing this settled definition of property, as I believe one must, the conclusion that petitioners obtained this property from respondents is amply supported by the evidence in the record."
What is tragic, however, about the correct outcome rendered by the Court on February 26, 2003, is that it is premised on the acceptance of baby-killing as a legal "right" and that Joe Scheidler and other pro-lifers had indeed broken various laws while engaged in their activities in front of abortuaries. This false premise communicates the belief that "anti-abortion protesters," although not engaged in racketeering or extortion to take property, can be prosecuted for the commission of such crimes as criminal trespass or harassment or the violation of the "Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrance Act" (FACE) in the course of their activities. The decision in the Scheidler case, though it provides immediate and real relief to individuals facing monstrous fines and punitive damages, is a reminder to us all that even justices who consider abortion to be wrong have to do all sorts of intellectual gymnastics to treat abortuaries as legal businesses while holding back the dam, so to speak, of overkill on the part of abortionists and their supporters to try to intimidate pro-lifers into complete and total silence on the most pressing moral issue of the day.
Joe Scheidler and other pro-lifers who have engaged in sidewalk counseling and other activist pro-life activities have committed no crimes. None whatsoever. Indeed, Joe Scheidler has been in the vanguard of defending the binding precepts of the Divine positive law and the natural law as the foundation of a just civil order. It is no crime according to God's law to try to save lives from cruel deaths and to save souls from the possibility of eternal damnation for contracting for the deaths of the innocent preborn. It is no crime to seek to lovingly approach a woman to inform her of what an abortion is and the fact that there are people who want to give her the love and the care that she may not now exists for her to receive. It is no crime to be present in front of American killing centers to pray Our Lady's Most Holy Rosary. It is no crime to hold signs that depict the graphic horror that is baby-killing. Indeed, it is our duty to actively oppose the evil of the American Holocaust.
Thus, the very fact that American courts saw fit to put Joe Scheidler and countless others through more than seventeen years of legal maneuvers and trials and appeals speaks volumes of the varied ways in which Roe v. Wade poisons the entirety of the American legal system. Sure, Joe Scheidler offered up his suffering to Our Lady's Sorrowful and Immaculate Heart. He united himself with the Cross of the Divine Redeemer. He knows that the suffering and the humiliation and the financial losses he has experienced are all redemptive, meant to be used by Our Lady for the honor and glory of the Blessed Trinity, for the salvation of souls, and for his own sanctification. One consecrated to the Mother of God knows that she uses everything we give her, that nothing we suffer is in vain. Nevertheless, it is so very tragic that pro-death groups sought to exploit the corruption of American law represented by Roe to put people whose only real "crime" has been to seek to save lives and souls.
The decision in the case of Scheidler v. N.O.W. is nothing short of miraculous. We must spend time on our knees to express our thanks that justice has been done for wonderful pro-life heroes. However, our gratitude to Our Lord and Our Lady should not blind us to the fact that this decision came about despite the active intervention of the allegedly pro-life administration of President George W. Bush against Joe Scheidler, who, as I pointed out twelve weeks ago this very night, has actually done real things to save actual lives, something that has been accomplished by no Republican administration in the past thirty years.
Remember these facts, ladies and gentlemen and remember them well:
1) The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances bill was passed in 1993 with the support of fourteen Senate Republicans including, some that were “pro-life,” including a chap named Addison Mitchell McConnell [ever hear of him?] and several allegedly "pro-life" members of the House. Not one effort has been made by Republicans in Congress to repeal this law, which will still be used to proscribe the ability of pro-lifers to be a peaceful, prayerful presence outside of American killing centers. (Could one imagine a "Freedom of Access to Death Camps" bill?) Republicans protect abortuaries. They take campaign contributions from abortionists. They even hire active pro-aborts, such as Lewis Eisenberg, to raise funds for them. The Republican Party is not the cavalry coming to the rescue of the babies.
2) By way of reiteration, one of the most outrageous things that any administration has done in the past thirty years, is for a Solicitor General of the United States to term a pro-life hero such as Joe Scheidler as engaging in extortion to "take property" from those engaged in the business of killing babies in their mothers' wombs for a living. Theodore Olson analogized Scheidler's activities to the "banditry" mentioned in the Hobbs Act. We must never forget this betrayal of the pro-life movement by the Bush administration. The fact that the Supreme Court ignored utterly Olson's arguments is a gift from God. Olson did everything he could to try to uphold Scheidler's conviction on the Hobbs counts. The decision in Scheidler v. N.O.W. is not what the Bush administration wanted. Don't ever forget that, folks. Not ever.
The battle for life continues on many fronts. As I have noted on so many other occasions, the battle we are fighting for the restoration of legal protection for the innocent preborn will prove victorious only if we fight simultaneously for the restoration of the Social Kingship of Our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ and the Queenship of His Blessed Mother. It is not until individual human beings and their societies subordinate themselves to the regal rule of Our Lord and Our Lady that every aspect of popular culture will reflect the realities of First and Last Things. Law will thus be subordinated to the Author of Law. And life itself will be lived with a view to the Particular and Last Judgments.
With heroes such as Joe Scheidler, a man who has stormed Heaven ceaselessly each day before he goes out onto the streets to counsel women to save their children, to inspire us, may we give thanks that justice was done in his case and may Our Lady continue to guide us as we seek that the ultimate expression of justice will prevail here and around the world: the Justice of which she is the Mirror, that of her Divine Son Himself.